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1 Introduction
Recent evidence from experimental economics indicates that the sluggishness of con-
sumers’ response to price changes may be due to insufficient price knowledge (Jessoe
and Rapson, 2014). Ignoring this fact in estimating demand responses may result in
biased elasticity estimates. Further obstacles to consistently estimating demand elas-
ticities emerge from the prevalence of tariffs that include a fixed fee, as this would lead
to endogeneity bias (Taylor et al., 2004). This kind of tariffs is standard in numerous
retail markets, such as telecommunication, natural gas and electricity markets. Endo-
geneity issues are all the more relevant if consumers are free to choose from a broad
range of tariffs, as is common in Germany since the liberalization of European electric-
ity markets in 1998.
Based on detailed panel data originating from Germany’s Residential Energy Con-
sumption Survey (GRECS) for the years 2011 and 2012, we estimate the households’
response to power price changes, thereby employing an instrumental-variable (IV) ap-
proach to cope with the likely endogenous tariff choice. As instrument for the endoge-
nous price variable, we use the composite of grid and licence fees. With these fees
accounting for about 26% of mean consumer prices, our instrument is strongly corre-
lated with the endogenous price variable. Moreover, these fees are set exogenously at
the regional level, so that it seems warranted to assume that this price component does
not affect consumers’ tariff choice and consumption level. By exploiting our informa-
tion on the households’ knowledge about power prices, we additionally employ an
Endogenous Switching Regression Model to estimate price elasticities for two groups
of households, finding that only those households that are informed about prices are
sensitive to price changes, whereas the electricity demand of uninformed households
is entirely price-inelastic.
These results are of particular relevance given that electricity prices for German
households have virtually doubled since the beginning of the new millennium (BDEW,
2016:48) when prices reached their minimum after the liberalization of the electricity
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market in 1998. A key consequence of this liberalization for households was the op-
portunity to, for the very first time, freely choose their electricity provider. Yet, despite
such measures to improve competition, household electricity prices have steadily in-
creased since 2000, with the introduction of new taxes and levies being a major reason
(BNetzA, 2014). For instance, with the declared aim to stabilize the contribution rates
to the national pension insurance scheme, an eco-tax on electricity was raised in 1999,
whose magnitude doubled by 2003. Currently, taxes and levies account for more than
half of the power prices for German households (BDEW, 2016:48).
Another key reason for rising power prices was the introduction of a feed-in tariff
support scheme for renewable energy technologies in 2000. While this support scheme
was very effective in increasing the share of green electricity in gross consumption,
from less than 7% in 2000 to about 33% in 2015 (BDEW, 2016:15), the resulting bur-
den for consumers particularly mounted in recent years, above all due to the explod-
ing expansion of photovoltaic capacities (Frondel et al., 2015). As a consequence, the
levy with which electricity consumers have to finance the support for green electricity
more than quadrupled between 2009 and 2016, increasing from 1.31 to 6.35 cents per
kilowatt-hour (kWh). Today, the electricity prices that have to be borne by German
households are – in terms of purchasing power parities – the highest in the European
Union (Eurostat, 2015).
The subsequent Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on the residential
demand for electricity. Section 3 concisely summarizes our database, followed by the
presentation of the estimation results in Sections 4 and 5. The last section closes with a
summary and conclusions.
2 Findings from the Literature
The received literature suggests that price knowledge may substantially alter the de-
mand for goods and services. Gaudin (2006), for instance, analyzes the effect of de-
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tailed price information presented on water bills, finding that households that are
aware of price levels are considerably more sensitive to price changes than price-ignorant
households. In a similar vein, examining the effect of price knowledge for various util-
ity services, Carter and Milon (2005) also reach the conclusion that informed house-
holds are more responsive to prices than those without any clue about prices. For
electricity markets, though, evidence on the impact of price information is scant and
only available in the context of real-time pricing. For example, in an experimental
setting, Jessoe and Rapson (2014) recently find demand response to triple when price
information is provided.
To our knowledge, however, there is no evidence on the effect of price knowledge
on electricity consumption levels in retail markets without real-time pricing, although
the demand for electricity has been investigated by economists ever since its discov-
ery. Moreover, despite a large body of empirical studies, no broad consensus has been
reached about the size of the response of residential electricity demand to changing
power prices. In fact, price elasticity estimates cover a large range (Fell et al., 2014;
Reiss and White, 2005; Shin, 1985; Taylor, 1975), stretching from 0, that is, an entirely
price-inelastic demand, to a high elasticity estimate of about -2.5.
A key reason for these huge discrepancies is the specification of the price vari-
able (Espey et al., 2004). While a central assumption in economic theory is that con-
sumers optimize with respect to marginal prices (Ito, 2014:537), recent empirical find-
ings suggest that consumers tend to react to alternative price measures. Ito (2014),
for example, finds strong evidence that households respond to average prices, rather
than (expected) marginal prices. By analyzing the price measure issue as well, Boren-
stein (2009) comes to similar conclusions, claiming that consumers do not respond
to marginal prices due to the lack of price knowledge as a consequence of the non-
linearity of tariffs.
While such findings suggest the use of average prices in estimating demand re-
sponses, this approach can lead to biased results if tariffs entail a fixed fee. This issue
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is highly relevant for our analysis, as the predominant pricing model in Germany’s re-
tail market for electricity includes two components: a monthly fixed fee and a constant
marginal price per kilowatt-hour (kWh). While Baker et al. (1989) claim that the bias
due to fixed fees is small, Taylor et al. (2004) argue that large magnitudes of price elas-
ticity estimates, as well as good model fits, are just statistical artifacts of the usage of
the average price pa as price measure, with the average price being defined as follows:
pa :=
pmq + f
q
, (1)
where q denotes consumption, pm designates the marginal price, and f the fixed fee.
In fact, it is straightforward to demonstrate that ∂ ln q∂ ln pa , the price elasticity of de-
mand, approaches -1 if the average price pa is much larger than the marginal price
pm: pa >> pm. While rearranging definition (1) yields q = f /(pa − pm) and, hence,
∂q
∂pa
= − f /(pa − pm)2 = −q/(pa − pm), employing this derivative provides for the
demand elasticity with respect to the average price pa:
∂ ln q
∂ ln pa
=
pa
q
· ∂q
∂pa
= − pa
q
· q
pa − pm = −1−
pm
pa − pm , (2)
where the last term approaches -1 for pa >> pm, as then the ratio
pm
pa−pm comes close to
zero. Note that for the special case of a flat rate f > 0, that is, pm = 0, the average price
elasticity of demand, ∂ ln x∂ ln pa , is identical to -1.
In sum, irrespective of the service under scrutiny, we arrive at the general con-
clusion that in case of tariffs that include a fixed fee, using average prices for esti-
mating price elasticities may lead to a massive overestimation of demand responses.
In addition, while it is argued that with non-linear block tariffs, which are common
in U. S. retail electricity markets, the information cost of understanding the marginal
price of electricity is likely to be substantial (Ito, 2014:560), it is more easy for German
households to find the constant marginal price per kWh on their bill than to calculate
the average price per kWh by dividing total payments by total consumption. If at all,
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therefore, German households are aware of marginal prices, rather than average cost
per kWh.
3 Data
We draw on detailed panel data originating from a survey among about 8,500 house-
holds, conducted in 2014 as part of the German Residential Energy Consumption Sur-
vey (GRECS) – see RWI and forsa (2016). Since the mid-90s, the GRECS has been regu-
larly commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Economics and Energy (BMWI) to RWI
and forsa. In addition to electricity consumption and cost data that households report
from their electricity bills for the years 2011 and 2012, this survey provides for rich in-
formation on socio-economic and other household characteristics, such as household
net income, household size, age and education of the household head, and ownership
of the household’s residence.1 Information on whether a household resides in a ru-
ral or urban area is provided by the Federal Statistical Office (Destatis 2015) and was
merged to our database. The billing information includes marginal prices pm per kWh,
monthly fixed fees, total electricity expenditures and precise consumption values.2
Average prices pa are calculated by dividing total expenditures, including monthly
fixed fees, by total consumption. According to our experience with conducting the
GRECS, it is typical that only about one third of all survey households are able to pro-
vide reliable information on their electricity bills, whereas this information is lacking
for the remaining households, usually because they do not keep their bills for former
years. Moreover, we have skipped observations from households with overlapping
bills, as well as from households that provided information for less than 30 billing
days. For these reasons, we end up with an estimation sample of 6,484 observations.
1Income was provided in categories and recoded on class middles to derive a continuous variable.
2The time lag between the survey year 2014 and the years 2011 and 2012, for which billing informa-
tion is gathered, results from the fact that bills are available only with a time lag of at least one year,
as this is the usual billing period. If several bills are available that at least partly cover either of the
years 2011 and 2012, we have computed the marginal price pm as weighted mean, taking billing days
per calendar year as weight.
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Before reporting billing information, the respondents were requested to gauge the
marginal price per kWh they had to pay for 2012, yet without looking at their bills. By
comparing each household’s estimate with the price that was actually paid, we have
been able to construct an indicator for a household’s price knowledge: If a household’s
ex-ante estimate deviates by less than ± 20% from the actual marginal price, this indi-
cator takes on the value of 1 and 0 otherwise. According to this definition, 61% of our
sample households have a coarse impression of electricity prices (Table 1). Alternative
bandwidths using deviations of ± 10% and ± 15% have also been employed for the
definition of price knowledge, leaving our estimation results largely unaltered.
Identification of the switching regression model, described in detail in Section 5,
requires at least one variable that determines the respondents’ price knowledge, yet
not their electricity consumption level. Such a variable would fulfill what is commonly
called the exclusion restriction. To this end, we exploit the information on whether a
household changed its electricity supplier during the three years prior to the survey
(Supplier Change = 1). It seems plausible that households searching for a new supplier
might gather information on tariffs and prices and, hence, become familiar with power
prices.
It bears noting that with 3,670 kWh, our sample households’ average electricity
consumption per annum roughly matches the annual consumption of a typical Ger-
man household, which amounts to about 3,500 kWh according to BNetzA (2014). Fur-
thermore, the average price of 26 cents per kWh obtained from our sample fits to the
mean household price of 25.89 cents that is published by Eurostat (2015) for 2012. The
difference between the means of the average and marginal prices of 6 cents (Table 1)
indicates that the fixed fee accounts for around one quarter of total electricity costs.
With e 3,041 per month, the mean net income of our sample households is very close
to the e 3,069 that is reported as average income for German households in 2012 by
the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis, 2015).
Unlike electricity consumption, prices, and net income, there are substantial diffrences
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between our sample and the German population with respect to other variables. For
example, with 67%, the share of home owners in our sample is far higher than the share
of 45.9% that is published by the German Federal Statistical Office (Destatis, 2014b). A
key reason for this discrepancy is that in responding to the survey questions on electric-
ity cost and consumption for 2012, the share of tenants who can resort to information
from electricity bills is lower than the respective share of home owners, not least due to
the fact that tenants move more frequently than home owners. Not surprisingly, as it
was the household heads and, hence, exclusively adult household members who were
asked to respond to our survey, the respondents’ mean age of 56.2 years is higher than
the average of 45.9 years for the German population (Destatis, 2014a).
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Estimation Sample
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Electricity consumption q in kWh 3,670 2,093 670 26,535
Marginal price pm in e/kWh 0.20 0.03 0.12 0.28
Average price pa in e/kWh 0.26 0.03 0.15 0.40
Instrument z in Cents/kWh 6.55 0.77 4.15 8.91
Net household income 3,040 1,411 450 n. a.
Household size 2.35 1.12 1 11
Household size = 1 0.46 – 0 1
Household size = 2 0.21 – 0 1
Household size = 3 0.16 – 0 1
Household size = 4 0.13 – 0 1
Household size = 5+ 0.04 – 0 1
Age 56.2 12.9 18 86
Female 0.31 – 0 1
College preparatory degree 0.44 – 0 1
House ownership 0.67 – 0 1
Rural area 0.20 – 0 1
East Germany 0.16 – 0 1
Year 2012 0.52 – 0 1
Supplier change 0.31 – 0 1
As instrument z for the likely endogenous price variables, we employ the compos-
ite of local grid and license fees, which are region-specific and account for about one
quarter of the average consumer price (BDEW, 2016:48). Hence, our instrument z is
correlated with the consumer price, but due to the exogeneity of grid and license fees
to individual households, it seems to be warranted to assume that these price compo-
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nents do not affect consumers’ tariff choice and consumption level q. Hence, in formal
terms, our instrument z should, apart from its correlation with consumer price p, nei-
ther affect the consumption level q, nor should z be correlated with the error term ε of
any regression specification. In short, both identification assumptions for valid instru-
ments should hold: (1) Cov(p, z) 6= 0 and (2) Cov(ε, z) = 0.
While taxes and levies, such as the surcharge for the support of renewable tech-
nologies, are the same for all household consumers, grid and license fees significantly
differ across regions. In fact, grid fees are the highest in those federal states with the
strongest expansion of wind power capacities, most notably in North and East Ger-
many, as the connection of these additional capacities necessitates the augmentation
and enhancement of the existing power grids, as well as the installation of new power
lines.3
4 Panel Estimation Results
To contribute to the ongoing debate on the kind of price measure that is relevant for
consumer decisions, we begin by including two alternative price measures in our es-
timations, either the marginal or the average price. To provide for a reference case for
our IV estimates, we use standard panel estimation methods and estimate a double-log
specification, which is typically employed for estimating elasticities:
ln(qit) = α+ αp · ln(pit) + αT · xit + γi + εit, (3)
where ln(qit) denotes the natural logarithm of the annual electricity consumption qit
of household i at time t, p stands for either the marginal or the average price, pm or pa,
x is a vector of household characteristics, γi denotes the household-specific effect and
ε designates the error term.
3Data on grid and license fees at the postcode level for the years 2011 and 2012 were purchased from
ene’t, a professional provider of energy-related data. If grid and license fees changed during a calendar
year, we have taken the weighted mean of these fees, weighted by the days of their validity.
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While we have deliberately refrained from reporting fixed-effects estimates due to
the large number of time-persistent variables, our random-effects estimation results for
structural Equation 3 indicate that both marginal and average prices have statistically
significant effects on electricity demand (Table 2). With about -0.86, the demand elas-
ticity with respect to average prices is considerably larger than that for marginal prices,
which is quite close to, but in statistical terms different from zero. The estimate of -0.86
is in line with the results of Taylor et al. (2004), who demonstrate that estimations using
average prices are biased towards -1. This casts doubt on the usage of average prices
as the preferred price measure.
Table 2: Random-Effects Estimation Results for Logged Annual Electricity Con-
sumption either with Marginal or Average Prices as Regressors
Dependent Variable: ln q ln q
ln pm -0.085* (0.041) – –
ln pa – – -0.863** (0.044)
ln Net household income 0.108** (0.016) 0.099** (0.015)
Household size = 2 0.418** (0.020) 0.356** (0.018)
Household size = 3 0.690** (0.025) 0.618** (0.023)
Household size = 4 0.751** (0.027) 0.662** (0.026)
Household size = 5+ 0.943** (0.036) 0.848** (0.035)
Age 0.006** (0.001) 0.006** (0.001)
Female -0.035* (0.014) -0.025 (0.013)
College preparatory degree -0.029* (0.013) -0.022 (0.012)
House ownership 0.188** (0.016) 0.171** (0.015)
Rural area 0.091** (0.016) 0.101** (0.015)
East Germany -0.107** (0.018) -0.068** (0.017)
Year 2012 -0.001 (0.004) 0.024** (0.003)
Number of observations: 6,755 6,508
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the post code level; * and ** denote sta-
tistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
When employing marginal prices for estimating electricity demand responses, how-
ever, one must be skeptical, as well. Since the liberalization of Germany’s electricity
market in 1998, households are free to choose from a wide variety of providers and
tariffs. Hence, marginal electricity prices are likely to be endogenous, as rational cus-
tomers tend to select contracts that minimize their electricity costs. In contrast, in
former monopolistic markets, households had no opportunity at all to choose their
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provider and tariff, but were stuck with their local electricity provider, and, thus, elec-
tricity prices were clearly exogenous.
Yet, the price structure of the former monopolistic era, including a monthly fixed
fee, as well as a constant marginal price that is independent of consumption levels,
still remains the dominant tariff today, whereas alternatives, such as package and flat-
rate tariffs, are rarely offered. As changing both suppliers and tariffs have become
a common phenomenon, a simultaneity problem may arise: while, on the one hand,
consumption levels tend to be affected by prices, on the other hand, households’ tariff
selection may depend on consumption levels.
To cope with this simultaneity problem, we pursue a random-effects panel IV ap-
proach and employ the composite of the local grid and license fees as instrumental
variable z for the likely endogenous marginal price, noting that a correlation coeffi-
cient of 0.23 indicates the expected positive correlation between z and marginal prices
pm. This positive correlation can also be observed from the estimation results of the
first stage of the IV regression that is given by Equation 4:
ln(pit) = β+ βz · ln(zit) + βT · xit + νit, (4)
where the marginal price pm is regressed on our instrumental variable z and the vector
x of household characteristics, while ν designates another error term. Given that the
coefficient estimate on ln z reported in Table 3 is positive and statistically significant at
the 1% significance level, there is statistical evidence that the first assumption for valid
instruments holds: Cov(p, z) 6= 0.
At the second stage of the IV approach, instead of employing observed prices pm,
structural Equation 3 is estimated using the predictions l̂n pm, which are obtained
from estimating first-stage Equation 4. The results of the second-stage regression in-
dicate that, approximately, a 10% increase in marginal electricity prices comes along
with a decrease in electricity use of -6.2%. Using cross-sectional data originating from
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Germany’s Income and Expenditure Survey, which is conducted at 5-year intervals,
Schulte and Heindl (2016) find a quite similar own-price elasticity of 0.43 for residen-
tial electricity consumption (1993-2008).
Much less elastic is the household response with respect to income: An increase in
household net income by 10% induces an increase in electricity consumption of about
1%. The outcomes of the remaining variables are largely in accord with our expecta-
tions: While ceteris paribus home owners, older people, and those living in rural areas
have a higher electricity consumption than other households, it is a well-known fact
that, on average, households residing in East Germany consume less electricity (RWI
and forsa, 2016), as well as households with a female head. Not surprisingly, house-
hold size is an important driver of electricity consumption. The electricty use of a 3-
person household, for example, is 100[exp(0.69)-1]=99% higher than that of a 1-person
household.
Table 3: Random-Effects Panel Instrumental-Variable (IV) Results for Logged An-
nual Consumption
First Stage Second Stage
Dependent Variable: ln p ln q
ln z 0.155** (0.018) – –
l̂n p – – -0.615* (0.260)
ln Net household income -0.023** (0.005) 0.096** (0.017)
Household size = 2 -0.001 (0.007) 0.416** (0.020)
Household size = 3 0.001 (0.008) 0.690** (0.025)
Household size = 4 -0.014 (0.009) 0.742** (0.027)
Household size = 5+ 0.002 (0.013) 0.943** (0.036)
Age -0.001** (0.000) 0.005** (0.001)
Female -0.019** (0.005) -0.044** (0.015)
College preparatory degree 0.009 (0.005) -0.025 (0.014)
Home ownership -0.016** (0.006) 0.178** (0.017)
Rural area 0.029** (0.006) 0.105** (0.018)
East Germany 0.012 (0.007) -0.088** (0.020)
Year 2012 0.031** (0.002) 0.020 (0.010)
Number of observations: 6,755 6,755
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the post code level; * and ** denote statistical
significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
An important drawback of IV estimates is that their standard errors are typically
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larger than those of the respective OLS estimates (Bauer et al., 2009:327). In fact, if
a variable that is deemed to be endogenous is instead exogenous, the IV estimator
will be less efficient than the OLS estimator, while both estimators will be consistent.
If an instrument is only weakly correlated with an endogenous regressor, the loss of
precision of IV estimators may be severe. Even worse is that with weak instruments, IV
estimates are inconsistent and biased in the same direction as OLS estimates (Chao and
Swanson, 2005). Most disconcertingly, as is pointed out by Bound et al. (1993, 1995),
when the instruments are only weakly correlated with the endogenous variables, the
cure in the form of the IV approach can be worse than the disease resulting from biased
and inconsistent OLS estimates. Given these potential problems, it is reasonable to
perform an endogeneity test that examines whether a potentially endogenous variable
is in fact exogenous.
To this end, following the essential idea of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endo-
geneity (Hausman, 1978), we test whether the error term ν of Equation 4 is correlated
with the error term ε of structural Equation 3. Although neither ε nor ν can be ob-
served, one can employ the residuals of the first- and second-stage regressions and test
whether they are correlated. Alternatively, one can plug the residual νˆ as an additional
regressor into structural Equation 3 and test its statistical significance (Davidson and
MacKinnon, 1989). As a result, we get a coefficient estimate – not reported here – that
is significant at the one percent level, providing strong evidence for the endogeneity of
marginal prices.
While this outcome suggests the application of the IV approach, its validity de-
pends on the strength of our instrument. Given that the standard errors are not iden-
tically distributed, nor independent, as observations are clustered at the household
level, the weakness of instruments is tested using a Wald test (Kleibergen and Paap,
2006). With an F statistic of F = 116.1 for the coefficient βz of the first-stage regression
4, which is well above the threshold of 16.38 given by Stock and Yogo (2005), we can
reject the null hypothesis of weak identification.
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5 The Effect of Price Knowledge
In this section, we exploit the information on the households’ knowledge about power
prices by employing an Endogenous Switching Regression Model (Maddala, 1983) to
estimate price responses for two groups of households, those that are informed about
current price levels (Group 1) and those that are unaware of prices (Group 0):
price knowledge =

1 if γ ·wi ≥ ui,
0 otherwise,
(5)
In this definition, wi denotes those household characteristics that may affect whether
a household is informed about prices (Group 1: price knowledge = 1), γ is the corre-
sponding parameter vector, and the error term u is assumed to be correlated with both
error terms η1 and η0 emerging from the following structural equations, as there may
be unobservable factors that are relevant for both the selection into either group and
the consumption level.
In line with structural Equation 3, the behavioral response of households due to
price changes is described by two equations:
ln(q1it) = α1 + α1p · ln(pit) + α1 · x1it − σ1u · IVM1i + η1it if price knowledge = 1, (6)
ln(q0it) = α0 + α0p · ln(pit) + α0 · x0it + σ0u · IVM0i + η0it if price knowledge = 0, (7)
where η1 and η0 are error terms with zero conditional mean and
IVM1i :=
φ(γT · zi)
Φ(γT · zi) , IVM0i :=
φ(γT · zi)
1−Φ(γT · zi) (8)
represent the two variants of the inverse Mills ratios, with φ(.) and Φ(.) denoting the
density and cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution, respec-
tively. When appended as extra regressors in the second-stage estimation, the inverse
Mills ratios are controls for potential biases arising from sample selectivity. Selectiv-
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ity is likely, as unobservable characteristics, such as carelessness about electricity con-
sumption and bills, may affect both consumption levels and price awareness. If the
estimated coefficients – σ1u and σ0u – are statistically significant, this is an indication of
sample selectivity.
To investigate this issue, for the second-stage regression, we insert the predicted
values ÎVM1i and ÎVM0i, as well as the predictions for the endogenous marginal price
variable, using the probit estimates γ̂ of the first-stage estimation (Andor et al., 2016).
Alternatively, we have also estimated the above switching regression model for the
pooled sample using the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimator, as it
is more efficient than two-stage least squares methods and the maximum likelihood
estimator and provides consistent standard errors (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). To this
end, we have employed the Stata command movestay (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). The
results, reported in Table A.1 of the appendix, are similar – in qualitative terms – to
those displayed in Table 4.
The probit estimation results for the first stage of the switching regression model,
reported in the first column of Table 4, indicate that whether a household changed its
electricity provider during the three years prior to the interview positively affects its
price knowledge: The probability that such households are informed about price levels
increases by 28 percentage points relative to those that did not change their supplier.
To check whether selection bias is an issue and, hence, whether the use of a switch-
ing regression model is appropriate, we have performed a Wald test on the indepen-
dence of Equations 6 and 7. The test statistic – not reported here – indicates that the
null hypothesis of independent equations can be rejected at the 1% significance level.
Note, however, that both coefficient estimates on the inverse mills ratios are not sta-
tistically significant and, in qualitative terms, the estimation results displayed in Table
4 are similar to the random-effects IV estimates for the split sample (see Table A.2 in
the appendix), where structural Equation 3 is estimated separately for each subsample,
Group 0 and Group 1, without any control for selection bias.
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Table 4: Random-Effects Two-Step Switching Regression Results
First Stage Second Stage
Price knowledge Group 1 Group 0
Dependent Variable: ln q1 ln q0
l̂n p -0.136 (0.683) -1.010** (0.276) -0.082 (0.304)
ln Net household income 0.046 (0.044) 0.096** (0.025) 0.075** (0.029)
Household size = 2 0.182** (0.051) 0.320** (0.030) 0.484** (0.036)
Household size = 3 0.333** (0.063) 0.606** (0.042) 0.722** (0.054)
Household size = 4 0.227** (0.071) 0.668** (0.042) 0.792** (0.051)
Household size = 5+ 0.204* (0.095) 0.904** (0.055) 0.932** (0.060)
Age 0.009** (0.002) 0.006** (0.001) 0.003* (0.001)
Female -0.299** (0.040) -0.003 (0.029) -0.021 (0.036)
College preparatory degree 0.008 (0.037) -0.027 (0.018) -0.037 (0.025)
Home ownership 0.069 (0.043) 0.160** (0.022) 0.231** (0.029)
Rural area 0.083 (0.047) 0.114** (0.023) 0.071* (0.032)
East Germany 0.001 (0.053) -0.082** (0.026) -0.080* (0.032)
Year 2012 -0.008 (0.043) 0.031** (0.012) 0.008 (0.013)
Supplier change 0.280** (0.037) – – – –
IVM1 – – -0.073 (0.119) – –
IVM0 – – – – -0.083 (0.133)
Number of observations: 5,742 3,532 2,210
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the post code level; * and ** denote statistical significance at the 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
In sum, sample selection issues notwithstanding, in line with the literature (see
e. g. Gaudin (2006) and Carter and Milon (2005)), we find evidence that households
with a crude idea about current price levels (Group 1) are more price-elastic than un-
informed households (Group 0). In fact, for price-ignorant households, the price elas-
ticity estimate does not differ from zero at any conventional significance level (Table
4).
6 Summary and Conclusions
Consistently estimating consumer demand responses is frequently hampered by the
prevalence of tariffs that include a fixed fee. Such tariffs are standard in numerous
retail markets, such as telecommunication and electricity markets. The endogeneity
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problem arising from such a tariff structure is aggravated when consumers are free to
choose from a broad range of tariffs, as is common in Germany since the liberalization
of European electricity markets in 1998. To cope with the endogeneity resulting from
tariff choice, we have employed an instrumental-variable (IV) approach, using panel
data from the German Residential Energy Consumption Survey (GRECS) for the years
2011 and 2012. The IV estimate of the price elasticity of electricity demand of about
-0.62 indicates that, on average, households respond to power price changes.
This general conclusion, however, does not hold unequivocally: By additionally
exploiting our information on the households’ knowledge about power prices and em-
ploying an instrumental-variable Endogenous Switching Regression Model in which
we have replaced the endogenous marginal price variable by the predicted prices orig-
inating from the first-stage regression, we come up with the more differential con-
clusion that price knowledge appears to be crucial for demand response. In line with
Wolak (2011) and Jessoe and Rapson (2014), who find that information provision changes
the price elasticity of electricity demand, our results indicate that only those house-
holds that are informed about prices are sensitive to price changes, whereas the elec-
tricity demand of uninformed households is entirely price-inelastic.
With respect to the external effects of electricity generation, our findings suggest
that further increases in power prices, which are a likely consequence of Germany’s
ambitious transition of its energy system, only leads to substantial demand reductions
and corresponding environmental benefits if households are aware of marginal prices.
In addition to non-price interventions, such as social norm comparisons, which have
proved to be cost-effective in the U. S. (Allcott, 2011), we therefore propose fostering
information measures to improve the price awareness of households, not least because
providing price information has the potential to improve market efficiency. This is all
the more relevant, as due to recent technological developments, a growing number of
consumers can get access to real-time feedback on their price and consumption data
(Ito, 2014:561).
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Appendix
Table A.1: FIML Switching Regression Estimations Results
First Stage Group 1 Group 0
Dependent Variable: Price knowledge ln q1 ln q0
l̂n p -0.155 (0.680) -0.623* (0.273) 0.249 (0.411)
ln Household net income 0.046 (0.044) 0.114** (0.019) 0.070* (0.028)
Household size = 2 0.202** (0.052) 0.319** (0.023) 0.441** (0.034)
Household size = 3 0.338** (0.063) 0.606** (0.029) 0.647** (0.059)
Household size = 4 0.258** (0.073) 0.660** (0.031) 0.754** (0.048)
Household size = 5+ 0.245* (0.097) 0.901** (0.040) 0.897** (0.055)
Age 0.009** (0.002) 0.006** (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
Female -0.300** (0.040) -0.001 (0.020) -0.050 (0.046)
College preparatory degree 0.018 (0.037) -0.036* (0.014) -0.036 (0.022)
Home ownership 0.050 (0.044) 0.166** (0.017) 0.212** (0.029)
Rural area 0.094* (0.047) 0.101** (0.018) 0.043 (0.030)
East Germany 0.005 (0.053) -0.090** (0.020) -0.088** (0.030)
Supplier change 0.207** (0.063) – – – –
Year 2012 -0.004 (0.043) 0.020 (0.017) -0.009 (0.026)
Number of observations: 5,742 5,742 5,742
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the post code level; * and ** denote statistical significance at
the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Table A.2: Split Sample Random-Effects IV Estimation
Group 1 Group 0
Dependent Variable: ln q1 ln q0
l̂n p -0.527 (0.301) -0.105 (0.507)
ln Net household income 0.118** (0.024) 0.078** (0.030)
Household size = 2 0.327** (0.029) 0.493** (0.033)
Household size = 3 0.617** (0.035) 0.739** (0.044)
Household size = 4 0.672** (0.038) 0.802** (0.048)
Household size = 5+ 0.905** (0.051) 0.945** (0.054)
Age 0.007** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001)
Female -0.005 (0.022) -0.037 (0.026)
College preparatory degree -0.033 (0.019) -0.037 (0.025)
Home ownership 0.174** (0.021) 0.232** (0.034)
Rural area 0.098** (0.022) 0.077* (0.032)
East Germany -0.092** (0.027) -0.078* (0.034)
Year 2012 0.017 (0.013) 0.008 (0.020)
Number of observations: 3,541 2,219
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered at the post code level; * and ** denote
statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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